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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 
TELFORD LANDS LLC, an Idaho limited ) 
company; MITCHELL D. SORENSEN, an ) 
individual; and PU RANCH, a general ) 
partnership, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
DONALD WILLIAM CAIN and CAROLYN) 
RUTH CAIN, husband and wife, ) 
) 
Defendants-Appellants, ) 
) 
and ) 
) 
JOHN DOES 1-20, individuals and JANE ) 
DOES I -20, individuals, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
ORDER GRANTING STIPULATION 
TO AUGMENT THE RECORD 
Supreme Court Docket No. 39466-2011 
Butte County Docket No. 2010-64 
A STIPULATION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD was filed by counsel for Respondents on 
September 28, 2012. Therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that the STIPULATION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD be, 
and hereby is, GRANTED and the augmentation record shall include the document listed below, file 
stamped copies of which accompanied this Motion: 
1. Memorandum Decision Re: Motion for Reconsideration, file-stamped May 26, 2011. 
DATED this ~day of October, 2012. 
F or the Supreme Court 
cc: Counsel of Record AUGMENTATIO 
G STIPULATION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD - Docket No. 39466-2011 
In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 
TELFORD LANDS LLC, an Idaho limited ) 
company; MITCHELL D. SORENSEN, an ) 
individual; and PU RANCH, a general ) 
partnership, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
DONALD WILLIAM CAIN and CAROLYN) 
RUTH CAIN, husband and wife, ) 
) 
Defendants-Appellants, ) 
) 
and ) 
) 
JOHN DOES 1-20, individuals and JANE ) 
DOES 1-20, individuals, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
ORDER GRANTING STIPULATION 
TO AUGMENT RECORD 
Supreme Court Docket No. 39466-2011 
Butte County Docket No. 2010-64 
A STIPULATION TO AUGMENT RECORD was filed by counsel for Appellants on 
October 16,2012. Therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Appellant's STIPULATION TO AUGMENT RECORD be, 
and hereby is, GRANTED and the augmentation record shall include the document listed below, 
copies of which accompanied this Motion: 
1. Exhibit "D" which was attached to the Affidavit of Donald W. Cain and filed with the 
district court ~~ay 18,2010. (Now designated as Exhibit A.) 
DATED this jE'/day of October, 2012. 
cc: Counsel of Record 
No. 39466-2011 
"":" . 
, " ' .. ,' ~" 
~~:.:\: : :" 
r' 
t ':." ::'",: : 
.' .. 
ruG LOST RIVER IRRlGATIONDISTlUCT 
. P.O. ,BOX 205 • MACKAY, IDAHO 83251> (208) 588"2231' FAX: (208) 
588-2863 
October 7, 2009 
Don Cain' 
PO Box 927 
Moore, Idaho 83255 
Dear Don, 
This letter is a follow up to oUr phone conversation.on Oeto~er ~, 200.9 
where·you· requested·information on delivery·ofwater from ground water 
rlght'#34"1384.1 belongIDg to MItch Sorenson. 
. Water,.~ be.delivered from.that well to the Moore·C8:Dal as it h~ ~ 
. :dOne fu;fhe.past. When a well is pumped futo a canal belongipg:,~ t;h~ lUg 
14$fJUver'lrrigation District (ROOD), a Transport~metitwith tb( .. 
'BtRtDis)~qW~~ At present, this wa,(~ righ~ dQes ~ot have a 'i'rans~ri 
~melitandW9uld~equire one in order to transport·this well w~ter fu·.· 
'. the place of·1l8e. It woUld 'also require ail assessmembe paid to thErDistriCt 
" for the land on which it is used. 
.' . 
, ,. At.prea.e.nt; there·is an exiSting Transport.Agteem~-to~ water ·~ts ~34-
, 233~ aiip,·tf34-7079 belonging to PU Ranch LtD which histQrically has . 
been'nseci in'the Moore Canal for transport of wafertothe'place ofuse. 
These rights are pertinent to the same, well as Soreilson partly owns. 
If there are any qnesti,ons, please give me a call at 890-1447. 
James run eisch, Mgr 
Big Lost River Irrigation District 
..... 
T 
'" '.", 
, 
.. '
~'! •• 
EXHIBIT 
JA 
In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 
TELFORD LANDS LLC, an Idaho limited ) 
company; MITCHELL D. SORENSEN, an ) 
individual; and PU RANCH, a general ) 
partnership, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
DONALD WILLIAM CAIN and CAROLYN) 
RUTH CAIN, husband and wife, ) 
) 
Defendants-Appellants, ) 
) 
and ) 
) 
JOHN DOES 1-20, individuals and JANE ) 
DOES 1-20, individuals, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
ORDER GRANTING STIPULATION 
TO AUGMENT THE RECORD 
Supreme Court Docket No. 39466-2011 
Butte County Docket No. 2010-64 
A STIPULATION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD was filed by counsel for Respondents on 
September 28, 2012. Therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that the STIPULATION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD be, 
and hereby is, GRANTED and the augmentation record shall include the document listed below, file 
stamped copies of which accompanied this Motion: 
1. Memorandum Decision Re: Motion for Reconsideration, file-stamped May 26, 2011. 
tf~ DATED this .. day of October, 2012. 
For the Supreme Court 
cc: Counsel of Record 
ORDER GRANTING STIPULATION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD - ....... ,_,,_.~vc 
'IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BUTTE. 
TELFORD LANDS LLC, an Idaho Limited ) 
Liability Company, MITCHELL D. ) 
SORENSEN, an individual, and PU ) 
RANCH, a general partnership, ) 
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants, 
vs. 
DONALD WILLIAM CAIN and 
CAROL YN RUTH CAIN, husband and 
wife, 
Defendants/Counterclaimants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
------------------------~) 
Case No. CV-2010-64 
MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
F1LED tN CHAMBERS 
at \daho fans 
'\' . '~ollnh' Bonnevili\:. \.; U L,] 
Honorabt J'Jdje ll...JlM~~"'-
Date 
Time ~r.L.:j;. ~~;----
Deputy ClerK ~CJ..IjJA~--
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Each of the Plaintiffs in this matter is a property owner in Butte County. Plaintiffs each 
own and/or lease water rights that they use to irrigate their lands. Defendants, Donald and 
Carolyn Cain (hereafter, "Cains"), also own property in Butte County. Cains' property lies east 
of Plaintiffs' properties. The Moore Canal, which belongs to the Big Lost River Irrigation 
District (hereafter, ''the District"), runs from east to west across Cains' property and has 
historically been used to transport some of Plaintiffs' water pursuant to their water rights. 
\ 
In 2009, Plaintiffs installed an irrigation pipeline (hereafter, "Pipeline") that lies north of 
and approximately parallel to the Moore Canal. The Pipeline begins as two separate branches, 
one connected to the PU Well and the other connected the Old Moss Well. The two branches 
converge east of Cains' property, and the Pipeline then runs west across Cains' property until it 
ties into the DC Canal. Plaintiffs believe they had Cains' permission to install the Pipeline prior 
to installing it. Cains deny giving such permission. 
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Cains objected to the Pipeline after Plaintiffs installed it. At some point, Donald Cain 
dug up a portion of the Pipeline on his property and damaged it. Plaintiffs initiated this action 
following unsuccessful attempts to negotiate a settlement with Cains. Plaintiffs' complaint 
alleged breach of contract, estoppel, civil conspiracy, and condemnation. Cains answered and 
counterclaimed alleging trespass. 
On September 7, 2010, Cains filed a motion to dismiss Telford Lands, LLC (hereafter, 
"Telford") from this action for lack of standing. On September 17,2010, Plaintiffs filed a 
motion for summary judgment on their condemnation claim. On September 29, 2010, Cains 
filed a cross motion for summary judgment on all four of Plaintiffs' causes of action. On 
October 8, 2010, Plaintiffs filed a motion to strike portions of the affidavit of James Rindfleish. 
On October 20, 2010, the Honorable Joel E. Tingey issued a Memorandum Decision and 
Order (hereafter, "Decision and Order") that (1) granted Plaintiffs' motion to strike portions of 
the Rindfleish affidavit, (2) denied Cains' motion to dismiss Telford, (3) granted Plaintiffs' 
motion for summary judgment on their condemnation claim, and (4) granted Cains' motion for 
summary judgment on the issues of breach of contract, estoppel, and civil conspiracy. 
On February 3, 2011, Cains field a motion for reconsideration asking this Court to (1) 
dismiss Telford, (2) consider the stricken portions of the Rindfleish affidavit, and (3) rule in their 
favor on the condemnation issue. On April 13 , 2011, Plaintiffs filed a brief in opposition to 
Cains' motion for reconsideration. l On Apri119, 2011, Cains filed a reply briefin support of 
their motion. On April 20, 2011, this Court heard oral argument regarding the matter. 
I Plaintiffs' brief in opposition asserts they are entitled to an award of attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-
121 for fees incurred in opposing Defendants' motion for reconsidemtion. This Memorandum Decision does not 
make a determination regarding attorney fees as the issue is not properly before the Court at this time. See LR.C'p 
54( d)( 5)-( 6). 
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ll. STANDARD OF ADJUDICATION 
The decision to grant or deny relief pursuant to a motion for reconsideration is within the 
sound discretion of the trial court and, absent a manifest abuse of discretion, will not ordinarily 
be disturbed on appeal. Kirkland v. State, 143 Idaho 544, 547,149 P Jd 819, 822 (2006); Win of 
Michigan, Inc. v. Yrekd United, Inc., 137 Idaho 747, 754, 53 P.3d 330, 337 (2002). 
Ru1e 11 (a)(2)(B) of the Idaho Ru1es of Civil Procedure provides, in part, "A motion for 
reconsideration of any interlocutory orders of the trial court may be made at any time before the 
entry of final judgment but no later than fourteen (14) days after the entry of the final judgment." 
When considering a motion [for reconsideration], the trial court shou1d 
take into account any new facts presented by the moving party that bear on the 
correctness of the interlocutory order. The burden is on the moving party to bring 
the trial court's attention to the new facts. We will not require the trial court to 
search the record to determine if there is any new information that might change 
the specification of facts deemed to be established. 
Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat. Bank of North Idaho, 118 Idaho 812, 823, 800 
P.2d 1026, 1037 (1990). 
m. DISCUSSION 
A. Motion to Strike Rindfleish Affidavit 
Pursuant to the Decision and Order, Paragraph 6 and most of Paragraph 4 of the 
September 22, 2010 Rindfleish Affidavit were stricken on the basis that those portions of the 
Affidavit were without foundation. 
Rule 56(e) of the Idaho Ru1es of Civil Procedure sets forth the requirements for 
supporting and opposing affidavits: "Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on 
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as wou1d be admissible in evidence, and shall 
show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein." 
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\, 
Paragraph 4 of the Affidavit contains information regarding a response by the Idaho 
Department of Water Resources (hereafter "IDWR") to a water right transfer request by Plaintiff 
Sorensen. Paragraph 6 contains statements by Mr. Rindfleish regarding settlement negotiations 
between the District and Plaintiffs, and the reasons for Plaintiffs' transport agreements being 
terminated. 
Whereas this Court finds the stricken portions of Paragraphs 4 and 6 to be inapposite to 
the conclusions made below, there is no need to engage in an analysis of the admissibility of the 
statements. Cains' motion for reconsideration is denied on this issue. 
B. Motion to Dismiss Telford 
Cains argue Telford lacks standing to assert a condemnation claim and should be 
dismissed as a plaintiff in this action. 
In its Decision and Order, the Court stated the following regarding Telford's standing: 
The Court finds that as to Counts One, Two, and Three, Telford was part 
of a joint enterprise in 'installing the pipeline and would therefore have an interest 
in matters pertaining to the pipeline. Defendants' motion to dismiss as to Counts 
One, Two and Three [is] denied. 
Whether Telford has standing to seek an easement through condemnation 
is a more difficult question. The evidence establishes that Telford's property is 
west and downstream from Plaintiffs. The evidence also establishes that 
Telford's wells are also west of the Defendants' property. However, Telford has 
a lease from the Department of Water Resources' Water Bank whereby Telford 
may draw water from a well east of Defendants' property, which water would 
then be conveyed through the pipeline and desired easement. 
Telford's participation in the joint venture alone is insufficient to establish 
standing to seek an easement for the pipeline. Merely having an interest in the 
pipeline does not establish a beneficial use or necessity for purposes of 
condemning and easement. 
However, where Telford would clearly derive a benefit from conveying 
water from the P.D. Ranch Well, such confers standing upon Telford. Telford's 
standing should not be affected by whether he owns the water right by which 
water is diverted from the Well or whether he leases the right from the Water 
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Bank. Each would result in the irrigation of Telford's property consistent with a 
recognized public purpose. Section 42-1102 allows "owners of land" to seek 
rights of way for the watering of such lands. 
Where Telford would be directly benefited from an easement by which he 
could convey water from the p.u. Ranch Well to his property, Telford has 
standing and is a real party in interest. 
Decision and Order at 4-5. 
Cains argue, "the fact that Telford may currently have a year or less remaining on a water 
bank lease with the State of Idaho does not confer standing on Telford to institute eminent 
domain proceedings relative to the Cains' property." Cains assert that only water right owners 
can proceed under the law of eminent domain. Cains rely on the following language from 
Canyon View Irrigation Co. v. Twin Falls Canal Co., 101 Idaho 604, 619 P.2d 122 (1980) it in 
support of their argument: 
In order to assist owners of water rights whose lands are remote from the 
water source, the state has partially delegated its powers of eminent domain to 
private individuals. I.C. §§ 42-1102 and-ll06. See White v. Marty, 97 Idaho 85, 
540 P.2d 270 (1975). These statutes permit landlocked individuals to condemn a 
right of way through the lands of others for purposes of irrigation. 
To condemn such a right-of-way, the water right owner must proceed 
under Idaho's law of eminent domain, found in I.C. §§ 7-701 et seq. 
Id at 607, 619 P.2d at 125. 
In White v. Marty, 97 Idaho 85, 540 P.2d 270 (1975), the Idaho Supreme Court stated the 
following regarding the condemnation of irrigation easements: 
Chapter 11 of Title 42, Idaho Code, deals with ditch rights of way for the 
irrigation of land. I.C. § 42-1102 gives to landowners a right to an easement or 
right of way across the lands of others to supply irrigation water. If the landowner 
of an adjacent parcel refuses to allow such access for irrigation water, the owner 
of land may condemn a right-of-way under the law of eminent domain. I.C. § 42-
1106. 
ld. at 272-73 (emphasis added). Idaho Code § 42-1102 provides as follows: 
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() 
When any such owners or claimants to land have not sufficient length of 
frontage on a stream to afford the requisite fall for a ditch, canal or other conduit 
on their own premises for the proper irrigation thereof, or where the land 
proposed to be irrigated is back from the banks of such stream, and convenient 
facilities otherwise for the watering of said lands cannot be had, such owners or 
claimants are entitled to a right-of-way through the lands of others, for the 
purposes of irrigation. 
I.C. § 42-1102 (emphasis added). Idaho Code § 42-1106 provides as follows: 
In case of the refusal of the owners or claimants of any lands, through 
which any ditch, canal or conduit is proposed to be made or constructed, to allow 
passage thereof, the person or persons desiring the right of way may proceed as in 
the law of eminent domain. 
I.C. § 42-1106 (emphasis added). 
The plain language of §§ 42-1102 and 1106 gives landowners the right to proceed under 
the law of eminent domain if certain conditions exist. There is, however, no requirement in the 
statutes that the landowner also be a water right owner. The White decision reaffirms the 
statutory language of § § 42-1102 and 1106. Furthermore, Canyon View did not overturn White 
or alter the construction of §§ 42-1102 and 1106. In this Court's view, the language in Canyon 
View regarding "water right owners" was unessential to the court's holding, was an ambiguous 
recitation of the law, and is not controlling on the issue before this Court. 
With regard to easement condemnation claims, this Court concludes it is irrelevant 
whether a person owns a water right. Undoubtedly, landowners will need a water right in order 
to obtain water from a remote source, but the means whereby the landowner obtains that right 
(i.e., by purchase, lease, or some other way) is unrelated to the landowner's right to condemn an 
easement by eminent domain. See Beach Lateral Water Users Ass 'n v. Harrison, 142 Idaho 600, 
606, 130 P .3d 1138, 1144 (2006) ("Although a ditch easement typically concerns the conveyance 
of water, it is 'a property right apart from and independent of questions of water rights."). 
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This Court reaffirms its prior conclusion that Telford, being a landowner seeking water 
::from a remote source, has standing and is a real party in interest regarding the condemnation 
action. 
C. Motion for Summary Judgment on Condemnation 
Cains disagree with the Decision and Order regarding Plaintiffs' condemnation claim. In 
their motion for reconsideration, Cains argue (1) Plaintiffs' land is not "arid," (2) Plaintiff's' 
water rights require them to use the Moore Canal, and (3) Plaintiffs have attempted to create 
their necessity. 
1. Arid Lands 
Cains argue Plaintiffs' land is not arid because it has been irrigated for decades. 
Plaintiffs argue their land is arid because irrigation water continues to be necessary to 
grow crops. 
Article 1, § 14, of the Idaho Constitution permits the power of eminent 
domain to be exercised only in furtherance of a 'public use.' The irrigation and 
reclamation of arid lands is a well recognized public use, Idaho Const. art. 1, § 14, 
and art. 15, § 1; I.C. § 7-701(3), even if the irrigation project is ostensibly 
intended to benefit only private individuals. Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361,25 S.Ct 
676 (1905), affirming 75 P. 371 (Utah 1904). '[Article 1, § 14, of the Idaho 
Constitution] confers the right to condemn for individual use on the theory that 
the development of individual property tends to the complete development of the 
entire state.' Codd v. McGoldrick Lumber Co., 48 Idaho 1, 10,279 P. 298, 300 
(1929). 
Canyon View, 101 Idaho at 607,619 P.2d at 125. 
Although not essential to the court's holding, the Idaho Court of Appeals stated in Merrill 
, 
v. Penrod, 109 Idaho 46, 704 P.2d 950 (Ct. App. 1985) that dry and arid climates are those 
"where irrigation is necessary in order to cultivate the soil." Thus, whether a parcel ofland has 
been irrigated in the past is irrelevant in determining whether the land is arid. The important 
question, rather, is whether irrigation is required to cultivate the soil now and in the future. 
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In this case, there is no dispute Plaintiffs need irrigation water to cultivate their land. 
This Court concludes Plaintiffs' land is arid, and irrigation of that land is a public use for which 
the law of eminent domain may be evoked. 
2. Water Right Conditions of Approval 
Cains disagree with the Decision and Order wherein the Court. stated, "The Court. . . 
finds that identification of a delivery system in a permit, license, transfer application or other 
similar document is for descriptive purposes only and has no binding effect for purposes of the 
pending motions." Decision and Order at 7. 
Cains argue the Idaho Supreme Court, in Dovel v. Dobson, 122 Idaho 59,831 P .2d 527 
(1992), "clearly affirmed the statutory authority of the IDWR to impose conditions on a water 
right permit or upon a transfer application." Brief in Support at 14. Thus, Cains argue Plaintiffs 
are required to use the Moore Canal because their water rights specify the Moore Canal as the 
delivery system to be used in connection with the right. 
Whether Plaintiffs' water rights require, as a condition of use, that Plaintiffs transport 
their water via the Moore Canal is a question unrelated to the issue before this Court. As 
previously noted, a ditch easement is a property right and the condemnation of such easement is 
a matter apart from and independent of questions regarding water rights. See Beach Lateral, 142 
Idaho at 606, 130 PJd at 1144. Accordingly, Cains mayor may not be correct when they assert 
Plaintiffs must petition the IDWR if they seek to change or eliminate conditions regarding the 
delivery of their water. However, the conditions of approval listed on Plaintiffs' water rights 
have no bearing on Plaintiffs' ability to condemn an easement for the irrigation and reclamation 
of their arid lands. As Cains correctly point out, "[t]he relevant issue is one of necessity." Brief 
in Support at 12. 
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3. Necessity 
Cains maintain their argument that "the owners of the PU Ranch at all times had a legally 
viable means of having their water delivered through the Moore Canal, and did not have a 
legitimate basis to assert necessity in order to invoke eminent domain." Brief in Support at 9. 
Cairis believe the evidence shows Plaintiffs selectively terminated transport agreements, 
attempting "to create their own necessity." Briefin Support at 10. 
In its Decision and Order, this Court justified granting Plaintiffs' motion for summary 
judgment on the condemnation claim by stating the following regarding necessity: 
While use of the Moore Canal has occurred historically, the record reflects 
a number of potential problems with continued use of the Canal. There is no 
dispute that Plaintiffs have suffered and would continue to suffer a significant 
amount of water loss through use of the Canal. While some loss would arise from 
typical shrinkage, more troubling is the evidence that Plaintiffs also would bear 
the brunt of stolen water as well as unmeasured or improperly measured water 
diversions. The evidence is undisputed that there have been large fluctuations in 
delivered water and the Plaintiffs, when using the Moore Canal, have not 
consistently received their proportionate share of water when considering the 
volume of water put into the Canal. The evidence establishes that use of the 
Canal has been very inefficient in delivering water to Plaintiffs such that they 
have been unable to irrigate the full amount of acreage authorized by the water 
rights. 
Additionally, use of the Canal as a delivery system would be permissive 
only. While the evidence establishes that it is likely the District would agree to 
transport water to Plaintiffs, there would be no assurance or certainty that the 
District would continuously transport via the Canal. The record also reflects that 
certain conditions imposed by the District in its transport agreements would be 
undesirable if not unconscionable. Anyone intending to expend significant 
resources in reclaiming arid lands would certainly have to question the wisdom in 
doing so if the only way to irrigate the land was through the District's Moore 
Canal. 
Decision and Order at 7-9. 
Regarding the "necessity" requirement inherent in an easement condemnation claim, the 
Idaho Court of Appeals stated, 
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() 
Before condemning property, however, a plaintiff must show that ''the taking is 
necessary to such use." I.C. § 7-704. It is well established that the required 
showing is one of "reasonable" necessity. Erickson 1, supra; McKenney v. 
Anselmo, 91 Idaho 118,416 P.2d 509 (1966); Eisenbarth v. Delp, 70 Idaho 266, 
215 P.2d 812 (1950). 
Erickson v. Amoth, 112 Idaho 1122, 739 P.2d 421 (Ct. App. 1987). 
Cains argue there can be no necessity where an alternative means of transport exists. In 
support of their argument, Cains cite Erickson v. Amoth, 99 Idaho 907, 591 P.2d 1074 (1978) 
[hereinafter Erickson 1]. In that case, the Idaho Supreme Court stated, 
The Ericksons further argue that the trial court erred in not finding that the license 
agreement providing access over the Lederhos' land was a limited license. The 
fact that the Ericksons' existing access was by way of a license, rather than an 
easement across the Lederhos' land, does not destroy either the evidence or the 
finding of the court that alternative access routes existed nor the trial court's 
holding based thereon that necessity for condemnation did not exist. 
1d. at 910, 591 P.2d at 1077. 
This Court agrees that an alternative delivery system may negate a claim of necessity. 
However, one seeking to prove reasonable necessity ''need not show that a legally available route 
is absolutely impossible to use." MacCaskill v. Ebbert, 112 Idaho 1115, 1120, 739 P.2d 414, 
419 (1987). As the court noted in MacCaskill, "[t]here are few natural obstacles that could not 
be surmounted by modem engineering if unlimited resources were committed to the task." 1d 
Thus, reasonable necessity exists where ''the difficulty or expense of using the legally available 
route is so great that it renders the parcel unfit for its reasonably anticipated use." 1d On the 
other hand, mere inconvenience does not constitute reasonable necessity. Bob Daniels & Sons v. 
Weaver, 106 Idaho 535, 681 P.2d 1010 (Ct. App. 1984) 
The conclusion reached by the Court in its Decision and Order focused heavily on the 
hardships Plaintiffs would bear if forced to transport their water through the Moore Canal. In 
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~their motion for reconsideration, Cains have not presented any new evidence to alter or 
contradict the evidence the Court relied upon in making its decision. 
This Court reaffirms the conclusion in the Decision and Order that a new delivery system 
was reasonably necessary, and Plaintiffs are entitled to an easement across Cains' land. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing law and analysis, Cains' motion for reconsideration is denied. 
DATED thise2Co day of May 2011. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ;).Le day of May 2011, I did send a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing document upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the correct postage 
thereon; by causing the same to be placed in the respective courthouse mailbox; or by causing 
the same to be hand-delivered. 
Robert L. Harris 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
1000 RiverwaIk Drive, Suite 200 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
P.O. Box 50130 
Gary D. Slette 
ROBERTSON & SLETTE, P.L.L.C 
P.O. Box 1906 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-1906 
Trilby McAffee 
Clerk of the District Court 
Butte County, Idaho 
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